Skip to content
The Intellectual Framework
Open the Atlas
The Atlas · Logos · Discipline 29 of 58

Philosophy of Mind

What it is like to be you, and why that is so hard to explain.

Read it free13 lessons · about 0.9 hours · 11,882 words
The story

Mary is a scientist who knows every physical fact about color. But she has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room. One day she walks outside and sees a red rose. Does she learn something new? If yes, there are facts that physics leaves out. Philosophers have argued about Mary for forty years.

The question to carry

Could a perfect copy of your brain be you?

Say it at the table

Nobody has ever seen a thought. We only ever see what thinking does.

The film

Watch it in four minutes.

The briefing

What it is, in plain words.

  • 13 lessons
  • 13 modules, each with a test
  • 24 people explained
  • 41 works, places and ideas explained
  • 12 question final exam

The philosophy of mind asks what minds are and how they fit into a physical world. A brain is three pounds of cells exchanging signals. Somehow there is also the taste of coffee, the feeling of dread and the sense of being someone. The gap between those two descriptions is the subject.

Dualists hold that mind and matter are different kinds of thing. Physicalists hold that mental states are brain states, or are what brain states do. Each view has a cost. Dualism cannot explain how the two interact. Physicalism struggles to say why any of it is felt. Related puzzles follow: whether we have free will, what makes you the same person over time, and whether a machine could ever be conscious.

Five ideas to hold

1Consciousness

Subjective experience, the fact that there is something it is like to be you.

Consciousness is the fact of experience: the hurt of a pain, the look of a color, the sense of being present. Science can explain how the brain processes light. What it has not explained is why that processing is accompanied by any inner experience at all. David Chalmers called this the hard problem. Some think it will dissolve as neuroscience advances. Others think it shows that something is missing from our basic picture of nature.

2Qualia

The felt qualities of experience, such as the redness of red or the sting of pain.

Qualia are the raw feels of experience. Frank Jackson's thought experiment imagines Mary, a scientist who knows every physical fact about color but has lived her whole life in a black and white room. When she first sees a red rose, does she learn something new? If so, there seem to be facts about experience that physical science leaves out. Physicalists reply that she gains a new ability, or a new way of knowing an old fact.

3Dualism

The view that mind and body are two distinct kinds of thing.

Descartes argued that mind and body are different kinds of thing. Body takes up space and can be divided. Mind thinks and cannot. The view fits the intuition that you are not just your flesh. Its great difficulty was raised at once by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia: how can something without location push a physical brain around? Few philosophers today accept two substances, though some hold that mental properties are distinct from physical ones.

4Functionalism

The view that a mental state is defined by what it does, not what it is made of.

Functionalism says a mental state is defined by its job. Pain is whatever is caused by injury and leads to distress and avoidance, in the same way that a clock is anything that tells the time, whether made of gears or silicon. It follows that a mind could in principle run on something other than a brain. This is the working assumption behind much artificial intelligence research. Critics doubt that performing the right functions is enough for real experience.

5Personal identity

The question of what makes someone the same person from one time to another.

What makes you the same person as the child in your old photographs? Your body has replaced most of its matter. John Locke answered memory: you are the one who remembers being that child. But memories fade and can be false. Thought experiments sharpen the puzzle. If a machine copied you exactly and destroyed the original, would the copy be you? Derek Parfit argued that identity matters less than we think, and that what counts is continuity.

Five moments that made the field

  1. 1641Descartes argues that mind and body are separate substances.
  2. 1950Alan Turing proposes a test for machine intelligence.
  3. 1974Thomas Nagel asks what it is like to be a bat.
  4. 1980John Searle presents the Chinese Room argument.
  5. 1995David Chalmers names the hard problem of consciousness.

Still argued about

Open question 1

Could a machine ever be conscious?

Open question 2

Is free will compatible with a brain that follows physical law?

Open question 3

Would a perfect copy of you be you?

Plates

Things to look at.

Brain in a vat
Brain in a vat Philosophical thought experiment · Wikipedia
Rubin vase
Rubin vase Optical illusion developed by Edgar Rubin · Wikipedia
Turing test
Turing test Test of a machine's ability to imitate human intelligence · Wikipedia
Ideas

Three facts, one myth, one dare.

Did you know · 1The brain has no pain receptors of its own.
Did you know · 2In split-brain patients each half can answer the same question differently.
Did you know · 3Brain activity can begin before we feel we have decided to act.
The myth

The mind is just the brain's software.

Tap to turn it over
What is true

Nobody yet knows how physical activity gives rise to experience at all. That is the hard problem.

Try this

Close your eyes and try to find the "you" that is doing the looking.

The Origin of ConsciousnessKurzgesagt · one of the films in this discipline
Inside

13 sections, 13 lessons.

  1. 1

    The briefing

    Consciousness · Qualia · Dualism · Functionalism

  2. 2

    Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

    Defining Philosophy of Mind · Historical Overview and Key Questions

  3. 3

    Foundational Concepts and Distinctions

    Mind-Body Dualism vs. Physicalism · The Nature of Consciousness · Mental States and Properties: Beliefs, Desires, Emotions · The Problem of Other Minds

  4. 4

    Major Theories of Mind

    Dualist Theories · Physicalist Theories · Phenomenology and the First-Person Perspective · Representational Theories of Mind

  5. 5

    Consciousness and the Mind

    The Hard Problem of Consciousness · Qualia: The Subjective Quality of Experience · Theories of Consciousness

  6. 6

    Perception and Cognition

    Theories of Perception · The Role of Perception in Knowledge · Cognitive Science and the Study of the Mind

  7. 7

    Intentionality and Mental Representation

    The Nature of Intentionality · Mental Representation: Concepts, Propositional Attitudes · The Language of Thought Hypothesis

  8. 8

    Free Will and Agency

    The Debate Over Free Will · The Nature of Agency and Autonomy · The Problem of Mental Causation

  9. 9

    The Self and Personal Identity

    Theories of the Self · Personal Identity Over Time · Memory and Identity

  10. 10

    Artificial Intelligence and the Mind

    Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · Ethical Considerations in AI and Mind

  11. 11

    Philosophical Approaches to Mental Health

    Philosophy and the Understanding of Mental Illness · The Mind-Body Connection in Health and Disease · The Role of Philosophy in Psychological Well-being

  12. 12

    Contemporary Issues and Debates

    The Intersection of Philosophy of Mind with Neuroscience and Psychology · Emergentism and the Mind · The Future of Mind Studies: Challenges and Possibilities

  13. 13

    Conclusion

    Summary of Key Points · The Continuing Relevance of Philosophy of Mind · Further Reading and Resources

From the text

Dualists hold that mind and matter are different kinds of thing. Physicalists hold that mental states are brain states, or are what brain states do. Each view has a cost. Dualism cannot explain how the two interact. Physicalism struggles to say why any of it is felt. Related puzzles follow: whether we have free will, what makes you the same person over time, and whether a machine could ever be conscious.

Keep reading in the Atlas

Figures

People to know.

Rene Descartes1596-1650

Mind and body as two substances

David Chalmersborn 1966

The hard problem of consciousness

Daniel Dennett1942-2024

Consciousness explained, or explained away

Thomas Nagelborn 1937

What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

Gilbert Ryle1900-1976

The ghost in the machine

Canon

Books to read.

  • Consciousness ExplainedDaniel Dennett
  • The Conscious MindDavid Chalmers
  • The Mind's IHofstadter and Dennett
From the viva

A question from its final exam.

Dualism holds that

Who is in it

24 people, each one explained.

Twelve of them are below. In the Atlas every name, work and place in the text opens a short account of who or what it is.

  • David Chalmers born 1966
    Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist
  • René Descartes 1596 to 1650
    French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist
  • Aristotle c. 384 BC to c. 322 BC
    Greek philosopher
  • Plato c. 429 BC to c. 349 BC
    4th-century BCE Greek philosopher
  • Daniel C. Dennett 1942 to 2024
    American philosopher
  • Friedrich Nietzsche 1844 to 1900
    German philosopher
  • Alan Turing 1912 to 1954
    English computer scientist
  • Augustine of Hippo 354 to 430
    Christian theologian, philosopher, and saint
  • Bernard Baars born 1946
    American neuroscientist
  • David Hume 1711 to 1776
    Scottish philosopher, economist, and historian
  • Edmund Husserl 1859 to 1938
    German philosopher, known as the father of phenomenology
  • Franz Brentano 1838 to 1917
    German philosopher and psychologist as well as refounder of the theory of intentionality

Descriptions and dates from Wikidata. Portraits from Wikimedia Commons, each linked to its author and license.

Also worth knowing

What a full picture of the field includes.

Every chapter was checked against a list of the names and terms a student of the subject should meet. These are the most important ones the book itself does not name.

Hilary Putnam1926 to 2016

Philosopher who argued that the same mental state can be realized in different physical systems, which supported functionalism.

Eliminative materialism

The view, defended by Paul and Patricia Churchland, that beliefs and desires may turn out not to exist as we imagine them.

Epiphenomenalism

The view that mental events are caused by the brain but cause nothing themselves, like steam from an engine.

Philosophical zombie

A being physically identical to a person but with no inner experience. If it is conceivable, some argue, consciousness is more than physics.

Saul Kripke1940 to 2022

Philosopher whose arguments about naming and necessity were used to challenge the claim that pain just is a brain state.

Donald Davidson1917 to 2003

Philosopher of anomalous monism: every mental event is a physical event, yet no strict laws link the two descriptions.

Extended mind

Andy Clark and David Chalmers's thesis that tools such as a notebook or a phone can be part of a person's thinking.

Benjamin Libet1916 to 2007

Researcher whose 1980s experiments found brain activity that begins before a person reports deciding to move.

Integrated information theory

Giulio Tononi's proposal that consciousness is a matter of how much information a system integrates.

Global workspace theory

Bernard Baars's proposal that a content becomes conscious when it is broadcast widely across the brain.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty1908 to 1961

French philosopher who held that the mind is always embodied. We know the world through a living body.

More of the field

9 more people and ideas a student of this subject should meet. In the Atlas each one opens a card with facts, dates and a portrait.

Antonio DamasioAvicennaBaruch SpinozaG. E. M. AnscombeGottfried Wilhelm LeibnizLudwig WittgensteinNagarjunaP. F. StrawsonRobert Millikan

Read Philosophy of Mind.

Free. The film, the briefing and the first section open without an account.